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In this paper, we present a methodology for quantifying the degree of fit between a mission and an 
organization based on the closeness between the task structure (i.e., resource requirements and task 
interdependence) and the DM-asset allocation across the organization (i.e., amount and distribution 
of resource capabilities among DMs, and organizational processes).  This closeness is based on 
three main characteristics of organizational performance: workload balance, communication 
requirements, and DM-DM dependence.  These characteristics are affected, in turn, by the 
interactions and interdependencies of the organizational processes and the demands of the mission 
scenario.  Invariably, coordination is essential to achieve good performance because the 
information required for decisionmaking is often distributed.  However, excessive DM-DM 
communication and coordination are harmful to performance, since they increase the processing 
workload/overhead that delays task execution.   Performance improvements can be obtained by 
changing the structure and processes of an organization to decrease the requisite coordination, 
while balancing the levels of workload across the organization and reducing inter DM dependence. 
 
1. Introduction* 
An organization is said to be congruent with its mission 
if its structure and processes are matched to the 
environmental parameters [1], [10]. The degree of 
“match” (“fit”) between an organization and a mission 
can be quantified based on its performance or structure.  
The concept of performance-based congruence is 
relative: the degree to which an organization is 
congruent to a mission is obtained by comparing its 
performance to that of an “optimal” organization for the 
same mission.  However, finding this optimal 
organization is computationally prohibitive for real-time 
mission monitoring, re-planning and decision support.  
On the other hand, human-in-the-loop simulations, 
needed for performance evaluation, present a challenge 
in uncertain and dynamic environments, where the effort 
to achieve dynamic congruence forces organizations to 
adapt, while they continue to operate [11].  In situations 
involving dynamic and uncertain environments, we turn 
to the concept of structure-based congruence measures. 
 
                                                
In this paper, we argue and provide evidence that 
structure-based congruence is a multi-dimensional 
concept involving resources, task structure and 
organizational processes (e.g., workload balance).  We 
define structure-based congruence measures by 
evaluating the closeness of task parameters with the 
organizational structure and processes.  Based on 
substantial evidence in the management literature [1], 
[10], [5], and our normative organizational design 
process [8,9] developed as part of the Adaptive 
Architectures for Command and Control (A2C2) 
program, we hypothesize that the better an organization 
is matched to its mission, the better will that 
organization perform.  In order to validate the normative 
 
* This work was supported by the Office of Naval Research under 




The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
describes how we represent missions and organizations. 
Section 3 formalizes organizational processes and 
measures for evaluating the degree of congruence. 
Section 4 discusses the task execution model to evaluate 
the delays associated with task processing and 
communication. Section 5 distinguishes among the three 
dimensions of congruence: resource, task network, and 
workload balance congruence. Sections 6 & 7 describe 
the application of our congruence hypotheses in the 
design of Experiment 8. Section 8 concludes with the 
summary and future extensions. 
predictions, namely that structure-based congruence 
leads to performance-based congruence, we designed 
and conducted a team-in-the-loop A2C2 experiment 
using two different organizational structures and two 
different missions.  The first organizational structure was 
to be congruent (matched) with the first mission, but 
highly mismatched (i.e., exhibit low congruence) to the 
second mission.  The reverse is true for the second 
organizational structure.  The experiment – number 8 on 
the list of A2C2 empirical milestones – was conducted at 
NPS in August and November 2002.  The objective of 
this experiment was to compare theoretically predicted 
and experimentally observed measures of congruence 
between the missions and the organizations.  In this 
paper, we describe how we reverse synthesized missions 
to generate mismatches with organizations, and how we   
modeled the specific structural mismatches and matches 
among the corresponding elements of organizations and 
missions.  The model serves as the basis of our structure-
based congruence framework. 
2. Representing Missions and Organizations 
2.1. Tasks and Task Graphs 
A fundamental question underlying a distributed 
organizational design - ‘who should do which part of the 
mission?’ - implies that the mission must be 
decomposable into a set of entities.  These entities are 
generally referred to as tasks. A Task is an activity that 
entails the use of relevant resources (provided by 
organization’s assets) and is carried out by an individual 
DM or a group of DMs to accomplish the mission 
objectives. Every task in itself represents a “small 
mission”, and can oftentimes be further decomposed into 
more elementary tasks.   
In our work, the congruence between an organization 
and a mission is measured by the structural interaction 
between the organization and its environment. 
Informally, the incongruence between the organization 
and a mission can be perceived as the structural fit 
depicted in Fig. 1.1. 
In our model, we characterize a task  ( iiT N,...,1 , 
where N is the number of tasks) by specifying the 
following basic attributes: 
Mission Mission
Organization Organization
Incongruent Congruent  
x Task release time  (time at which the task appears 
in the mission scenario); 
ib
x Task processing time window, t  (maximal time 
available from the start of task execution to its 
finish; this time window is used to synchronize 
assets assigned to this task: it indicates the time 
window during which these assets must be “applied” 
to execute the task); 
ai
ˆ
Figure 1.1. Informal visualization of (mis)match between a 
mission and an organization 
A congruent organization minimizes the levels of 
workload imbalance, communication requirements, and 
DM-DM dependence.  Our methodology is based on 
identifying these three characteristics via a fit of specific 
structural parameters of organizations and missions. The 
parameters include: 
x Task processing time  (the interval between the 
time the first asset starts executing the task and the 
time at which the last asset finishes the task; the task 
processing time must not exceed the task processing 
time window: ); 
it
aii tt ˆdx Organization: DM-asset allocation and 
organizational  structure (authority and 
communication). x Task accuracy iD ; 
x Mission: task density, locations, information flow, 
task precedence, and resource requirements. 
x Task start time  (corresponding to the time that a 
task execution is started, and obtained during 
mission execution); 
is
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x Geographical location of task (  in a state 
space.  The location parameters can be used to 
compute the “distance” d  between tasks T  and T ; 
), ii yx
ij i j
x Resource requirement vector [ , where 
 is the number of units of resource l required for 
successful processing of task T  ( , where L 
is the number of resource types); 
],...,, 21 iLii RRR
i Ll ,...,1 
ilR
x Task value iZ  (task value reflects the importance of 
individual tasks – either on a relative or absolute 
basis – and is taken as an indicator of the 
commander’s intent or priority; all tasks are not 
equally important). 
A Task Graph is a dependency diagram that details the 
following interrelationships among tasks: 
x task precedence; 
x inter-task information flow; and 
x input-output relationships between tasks. 
A directed acyclic task-precedence graph represents the 
plan to execute a mission. 
2.2. Assets 
An Asset is a physical entity of an organization that 
provides resource capabilities and is used to process 
tasks. For each asset  ( m , where mP K,...,1 K  is the 
number of assets), we define its maximal velocity v  
and its resource capability vector [ , where 
 specifies the number of units of resource type l 
available on asset .  Assets must be routed among 
task locations to execute the assigned tasks. Assets can 
begin to process the same task at different times, but 
must be synchronized to complete a task in a specified 
task processing window. For each asset-task pair, the 






2.3. Decision-makers and Organizations 
A Decision-maker (DM) is an entity with information-
processing, decision-making, and operational 
capabilities that can control the necessary resources to 
execute mission tasks, provided that such an execution 
will not violate the concomitant capability thresholds.  
An Organization is a team of human decision-makers, 
who coordinate their information, resources, and 
activities in order to achieve their common goal in a 
complex, dynamic, and uncertain mission environment. 
As a consequence of decentralization in large-scale 
systems, each DM only has access to a portion of 
organization’s resources and, possibly, to the 
information available to the team. The distribution of 
resources among DMs and their assignment for task 
processing are among the key elements defining an 
organizational design.  Team members must 
dynamically coordinate their resources to process their 
individual tasks, while assuring that team performance 
goals are met. The critical issues in team resource 
allocation are: who should own which resource, who 
should use which resource to do what, and when? An 
organization is therefore characterized by DM-asset 
allocation that provides DMs with resources to execute 
tasks.  The allocation is formally defined by: 
   a ,   (2.1) ®¯­ otherwise  0, 
    toallocated isasset   if  ,1 
 mjmj
DMP
for Kj ,...,1 , Dm ,...,1 , where D  is the number of 
DMs in the organization.  We assume that each asset is 
assigned to a single decision-maker, and cannot be 







3. Organizational Processes and Measures 
3.1. Mission Execution 
The critical issues in team task processing are: what 
should be done, who should do what, and when? The 
processing of a mission by an organization is identified 
by specifying asset-to-task assignment, and the 
corresponding DM-task allocation: 
   (3.1) ®¯­ otherwise  0, 
  task    toassigned  is  asset  if  ,1 
 ijij
T Py
     (3.2) 
®¯­
   
®¯­ 
otherwise 0,
1 1, that  such asset    if ,1
otherwise 0,






The asset-task assignment specifies the necessary 
interaction among assets when processing a task. This 
interaction necessitates coordination among DMs that 
have ownership of these assets; the DMs serve as 
information/decision/action carriers. Specifically, to 
model coordination-related overhead in an organization, 
we define two types of coordination: internal and 
external. Internal coordination accounts for the need to 
coordinate among assets assigned to the same DM. 
External coordination is the inter-DM dependence that 
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results from cooperative processing of a task by multiple 
DMs. 
3.2. Internal Coordination 
The workload associated with operating an asset must be 
determined from the specifics of asset’s operation and its 
involvement in task processing. We define an asset ’s 
operational workload as the aggregated load of tasks 









)( ,   (3.3) 
where  is the workload associated with executing 
task  using asset . Here, we assume that w  







The internal coordination workload of a  is 
defined as the aggregated workload of operating assets 









)()(I .    (3.4) 
3.3. External Coordination 
A direct DM-DM coordination between two decision-
makers  and  is the aggregated time 
associated with simultaneous processing of the same set 
of tasks: 
mDM nDM











The external coordination workload of a  is the 









),()( DE .   (3.6) 
3.4. DM Workload and Team Load Balance 
Workload of a  is defined as a weighted sum of the 
internal and external coordination workload of this DM: 
mDM
)()()( mWmWm EI EICW  .  (3.7) 
The weights for internal (W ) and external (W ) 
coordination specify their impact on the aggregated DM 
workload. While the total aggregated workloads of 
organizations with the same mission completion time 
may be similar, their performance is distinguished by the 
distribution of this workload among team members. We 
define the main performance measure of an organization 










2 )(1 CW .   (3.8) 
This measure accounts for both the mean and the 
variance of workloads, and, consequently, provides a 
measure of balance of the aggregated workloads of DMs. 
Given that two organizations O  and  have the same 
mission completion time or task gain on a mission , 
we say that organization O  is more congruent with this 




2    2OO 4 M,M,1 4 .  That is, the 
better an organization is matched to its mission, the 
better will be its workload balance among the DMs. 
3.5. Task Accuracy 






,   (3.9) 
then the accuracy of task completion is equal to 100%. 
However, in realistic applications where the resources 
are scarce, an organization may wish to reduce the task 
execution accuracy in order to achieve better timeliness. 
In order to accommodate timeliness-accuracy trade-off, a 
model of accuracy has been defined within the DDD-III 
simulator for scoring the DMs [6] as the average of 
squared ratios of the resource used to the resource 

















D ,   (3.10) 
where  is the number of non-zero resource requirement 
types of task T : , and  is the 
resources of type l used to process task  : 
Lˆ









mlimilil ryRR .  (3.11) 
The ratio of the resource used to the resource required 
identifies the percentage of satisfied resource for the 
corresponding resource type. The squaring of this ratio 
penalizes significant resource allocation mismatches. 
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3.6. Task Latency 
The latency of a task T  is defined as the time from the 
appearance of a task to the time when its execution 
starts:  
i
iii bs  W     (3.12) 







][1 GWW ,   (3.13) 
where 1][  iG  if the task has been executed by the 
organization, and = 0 otherwise.  The speed of command 
that can be achieved by the organization is inversely 
related to its task processing latencies.  That is, the better 
an organization is matched to its mission, the smaller 
will be its task latencies and higher will be its speed of 
command. 
3.7. Task Gain 
In the presence of time-critical tasks, an organization 
may trade-off task accuracy versus timeliness. For an 
organization that is incongruent with its mission, such 
engagement practices may result in the same levels of 
task timeliness as for a congruent organization. 
However, this timeliness is achieved at the cost of  lower 
accuracy. Therefore, a measure that reflects the task 
accuracy and timeliness tradeoff can be combined into a 
single measure, called the task gain. The task gain of a 
task T  is defined as the accuracy multiplied by its value: i
iiig ZD  .    (3.14) A
In order to visualize the dynamic pattern of total gain 
achieved by an organization over time, we define the 
accrued task gain G  [7] as an aggregate of task gains 
achieved by time t .  We increment the gain function 
when each task T  completes its execution (at time 
) with a task gain of . Therefore, the accrued 
task gain is computed as follows: 
)(t
i








)(][)( G , (3.15) 
where . Thus,  is a piece-
wise constant (i.e., stair-case) function as shown in Fig. 
3.1. An organization O  that achieves better task latency 
and higher task accuracy than, say organization O , on 
mission  is seen as having the accrued gain function 
®¯­ t otherwise   ,0





 tOG ;,1 M  rising at a faster rate  than  tO ;,2 MG . On 
the other hand, the final values of gain functions for both 
organizations might be the same, since the total 
achievable mission gain is the same for any organization 
and equal to  (and it will be achieved in 
case the organization completes all tasks with 100% 
accuracy). Hence, the ultimate measure of performance 
of an organization on a mission is the normalized area 
under the accrued gain function curve for this 






























 fTOA ;,1 M f
 TO ;,2 M fTO ;,2 M
1,...,1 n
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Figure 3.1. Accrued Gain Metric 
We say that organization O  with normalized gain area 1 on mission  (where T  is the mission 
end time – assumed the same for all organizations on the 
tested mission) is more congruent to this mission than 
organization  with normalized gain area 
M
2Of , if   f ATOA ; !






computation of accrued gain and gain area is 
straightforward. If {  ( n ) is the sequence 





kif ki , where 
 is the time of completion of task T . Hence, 
the accrued gain at time t  is equal to ,[
ki
f if
] , where  kGG 1[k  ] ] n , 































where fi Tf n  1 . 
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4. Delay Models 
4.1. Task Execution 
In our simulations, we considered a simplified task 
execution model (Fig. 4.1). Generally speaking, we 
decompose the problem of task execution into several 
subtasks:  
1) identification (task must be identified with 
sensor resources available to the organization); 
2) asset allocation (assets must be selected to 
execute the task); 
3) task prosecution (assets must be synchronized 
and routed to task location); and 










I A P E
 
Figure 4.1. Task execution chain 
In this model, identification subtask (I) and allocation 
subtask (A) are executed sequentially, while prosecute 
subtask (P) and execute subtask (E) are done in parallel 
(in DDD experiments, the latter subtasks involve parallel 
communication among DMs owning the assets in order 
to synchronize the assets’ time-over-target to complete 
the task in a specified processing time window). During 
the identification subtask (subtask I), the DM 
responsible for task completion is specified. Efficient 
asset-to-task allocation (subtask A) is essential to 
effective mission execution, since it reduces the delay 
associated with prosecution of the corresponding task 
(subtask P). If a single DM, responsible for executing 
the task, possesses the assets with the requisite resources 
to complete this task with a high accuracy, the problem 
of selecting the most efficient asset package to execute a 
task can be formulated and solved (note that the actual 
problem of resource-task allocation is NP-hard; see 
[8,9]). However, the problem becomes significantly 
more complex when a single DM does not possess the 
required resources. In this case, the allocation subtask 
should be further decomposed into elementary subtasks 
that involve asset prioritization, asset request, 
communication, etc. Informally speaking, the 
responsible DM would have to coordinate the actions 
with other DMs, requesting the commitment of their 
resources and their direct participation in prosecuting the 
task. Given the model above, we identify the times 
required to execute each subtask in the execution chain 
of task T : i
  - time required to identify the task; this time 
depends on the organization’s internal processes, 
locations of information sensors, etc.; 
I
i9




  - time required to send/route the asset  to 
the task location, including any waiting needed for 
asset synchronization; and 
P
ji ,9 jP
  - time to attack the task ( ) – from the 
first asset attack to the last asset-task completion. 
E
i9 iEi t 9









bs ,1 :min 999   .  (4.1) 
Also, note that task precedence constraints must be 
satisfied (that is, task execution cannot start before all its 
predecessors are completed). The actual processing time 
of a task is found as follows: 
 
¿¾









max,ˆmin 999 (4.2) 
From now on, we assume that the asset-to-task 
allocation variables { } are such that ijy
  aiijPjiyjiAiIii tesb ij ˆmax ,,1 : d  999 .  
This assumption does not imply that there is no resource 
wastage, but rather that the variables are given according 
to the actual asset-task processing that occurred during 
the mission. 
The subtask time parameters defined above implicitly 
affect the values of task start times in human-in-the-loop 
experiments. In our simulation models, we assume that 
all tasks are identified immediately ( ), and that 
the time required to determine the asset-to-task 
allocation is proportional to the number of DMs assigned 
to this task, but a single DM can assign the assets 
without any delay, i.e., . This 
implies that  can be viewed as the time required for 
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In order to normatively address the congruence 
hypothesis, we first identify the elementary 
dependencies between the characteristics of mission 
scenario and the processes of an organization. To do so, 
we need to identify the features of the mission that create 
an incongruent situation for one organization, and a 
congruent one for another. In the rest of this section, we 
illustrate the effects of mission/task parameters on the 
processes of various organizations (congruent and 
incongruent ones) using simplified examples. In all of 
the examples below, we assume that the coordination 
delay factor , asset-task processing time 1 A9 1,  ije , 
task processing time window , and task release 
time 
1ˆ  ait
0 ib  (all tasks appear at the beginning of the 
mission and are detected immediately, that is, ). 
Hence, task duration is fixed at , and the start time 
is found via:  
0 Ii9
1 it
allocation. The parameter  can be viewed as 
coordination delay factor.  
A9
The routing time  depends on the distance traveled 
by an asset and the asset’s velocity, and includes the 
time delay for asset synchronization (in our simulations, 
we assume that all assets assigned to a task must arrive 




4.2. Asset Utilization 
The assets typically have diverse operational and 
execution characteristics.  For example, a salient  feature 
of single-hit weapons located on the same platform (e.g., 
a carrier) is the “duty cycle”, which imposes constraints 
on utilization of weapons of this type.  Consequently, in 
our model, we specify a “duty cycle” time window j\  
for each asset .  During a duty cycle, no asset of the 
same type can be committed from the same platform on 














§  ¦ .  (5.1) 
5. Congruence Hypothesis 
5.1. Resource Congruence 
In order to formalize the effects of structural interactions 
between an organization and a mission, and to predict 
organizational performance, we utilize our 3-phase 
design methodology [8,9]. The performance of 
organization is obtained using the scheduling step (Phase 
I) of the design methodology; this step defines the 
processes of an organization executing the mission. In 
the following, we consider the notion of structure-based 
congruence measure derived from the following 
characteristics of the mission: 
In this subsection, we quantify the effects of task-
resource requirements on the processes of two distinct 
organizations. 
Table 5.I. Example of asset parameters 
Organization A Organization B
P1.1 [1,0] 1 (0,0) 1 1
P1.2 [1,0] 1 (1,1) 1 2
P2.1 [0,1] 1 (0,0) 2 1
P2.2 [0,1] 1 (1,1) 2 2
DM allocation
Assets Resource capabilities Velocity Locations
 
o Task-resource requirements; 












o Task precedence/dependence; and 
o Task load per resource type. 
These parameters determine the (mis)match between a 
mission and an organization because they affect the 
following four primary characteristics of organizational 
performance:  
Ŷ Accrued task gain; 
Figure 5.1. Example of Organizations Ŷ Workload balance; 
Assume that the organization consists of two decision-
makers, with two platforms assigned to each (Fig. 5.1). 
We consider two resource types. Asset parameters 
(resource capabilities, velocities, locations, DM-asset 
allocation, etc.) are shown in Table 5.I. It is evident that 
the resource capabilities of DMs (according to resource 
Ŷ Communication requirements; and  
Ŷ DM-DM dependence. 
The accrued task gain measure serves as the ultimate 
“congru-o-meter” for assessing the fit of an organization 
to a mission. 
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capabilities of assigned assets) are distinct for the two 
organizations. We define the aggregated resource 
capability vector of a  as DmDM m ,...,1,  






,   ¦
 
.  (5.2)  
In Organization A, DM1 has aggregated resource 
capability vector of , while DM2 has aggregated 
resource capability vector of [ . Thus, this 
organization has DMs with non-overlapping resource 
capabilities, and is termed Functional. In such 
organizations, the task execution capabilities of DMs are 
distinct.  The DMs need to have a global view of the 
mission in order to execute the mission successfully. 
]0,2[
]2,0
In Organization B, each decision-maker has aggregated 
resource capabilities vector equal to [ . This 
organization has DMs with maximally overlapping 
resource capabilities, and is termed Divisional. In this 
type of organizations, each DM has the same task 
execution capability as any other DM.  Consequently,  
the mission must be divided into geographical areas, 
delineating areas of responsibility for each DM in order 
to minimize task execution conflicts. 
]1,1
In the following, we consider two missions that are 
congruent with each of the organizations, and 
significantly incongruent with the other. The desired 
mission completion time T  is equal to 4 time units, i.e., 
accrued task gain is measured from 0 to 4 time units 
only. 
f
A. Example S1.A: tasks with resource requirements 
of the same type 
Consider a mission scenario (denoted by S1.A), 
consisting of  two tasks, with task parameters as in Table 
5.II. Each task requires the same number of resources 
(2), but of different types. It is evident that this scenario 
matches the functional Organization A. Indeed, this 
organization can execute both tasks with 100% accuracy 
without any communication delays by allocating (see 
Table 5.III) task T1 to assets P1.1 and P1.2 (and 
therefore to a single decision-maker DM1 in 
organization A), and task T2 to assets P2.1 and P2.2 
(owned by a single decision-maker DM2 in A). The task 
start times for Organization A are calculated as 
 ( 0 ; see equation 5.1). Organization B 
must have multi-DM task processing to achieve 100% 
mission accuracy, with . The resulting task 
start times are 
121   ss  Ai9
121   AA 99
221   ss . On the other hand, 
Organization B can execute the mission with a lower 
accuracy and with the same task latencies as 
Organization A. Assigning task T1 to asset P1.1 
(resources ) and task T2 to asset P2.2 (resources 


















 (equation (3.10)). The 
task processing schedules for Organizations A and B are 
shown in Fig. 5.2.  
T
P1.2 P2.1 P2.2 DM1
1 0 0
















Table 5.III. Example S1.A: task-asset-DM allocation; 
accuracy 100% 
tasks P1.1 DM2 DM1 DM2
T1 1 1 0 1 1
T2 0 1 1 1




The accrued gain function is depicted in Fig. 5.3. We can 
see that Organization A has a higher gain, and a higher 
gain area. The trade-off of accuracy versus timeliness by 
organization B only decreased the gain measure. Given 
the DM workload and gain area measures in Table 5.IV, 
we conclude that the Organization A is more congruent 
with scenario S1.A than Organization B. 
Table 5.IV. Example S1.A: Organizational Measures; 
workload weights W  1  EW




















Table 5.V. Example S1.B: task parameters 
value
T1 [1,1] 1 (0,1)
T2 [1,1] 1 (1,0)
Tasks Resource requirements Locations
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T1
T2
Organization B, 25% accuracy
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Gain area = 4
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1 2 3 4
Gain area = 2
 
Figure 5.3. Example S1.A: Accrued Gain Plot 
B. Example S1.B: tasks with resource requirements 
of different types 
Consider a mission consisting of two tasks, with task 
parameters shown in Table 5.V. Each task requires the 
same resource vector [ . ]1,1  
Table 5.VI. Example S1.B: task-asset-DM allocation; 
accuracy 100% 
tasks P1.1 P1.2 P2.1 P2.2 DM1 DM2 DM1 DM2
T1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0
T2 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1




It is evident that this resource requirement vector 
matches Organization B. Indeed, this organization can 
execute all tasks with 100% accuracy without any 
communication delays by allocating (see Table 5.VI) 
task T1 to assets P1.1 and P2.1 (and therefore to a single 
decision-maker DM1 in organization B), and task T2 to 
assets P1.2 and P2.2 (owned by a single decision-maker 
DM2 in B). The task start times for Organization B are 
computed as 121   ss  ( 09 ; see equation (5.1)), 









































Figure 5.4. Example S1.B: Gantt-Charts; accuracy 100% 
Organization A cannot avoid multi-DM task processing 
to achieve 100% accuracy, and, therefore, requires DM-
DM communication for asset-task allocation, with 
. The resulting task start times are 121   AA 99
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5.2. Task Network Congruence 221   ss
)0,1(
 for executing the mission with 100% 












In this subsection, we quantify the effects of task 
precedence and inter-task information flows on 
organizational processes. The flows among tasks could 
be conceptualized as either flow of information or 
commodities, or the dependence of DMs that execute the 
tasks with precedence constraints. In either case, delays 
are introduced into task processing, if the dependent 
tasks are executed by different DMs. We assume that the 
desired mission completion time T  for the scenarios 
considered in this subsection is equal to 5 time units. We 
consider a mission consisting of four tasks, with task 
parameters shown in Table 5.VIII, and different task 
graphs outlined in Fig. 5.6.   
f
Organization A can execute the mission with a lower 
accuracy and the same task latencies as Organization B 
(see Fig. 5.5). Assigning task T1 to asset P1.1 (resources 
) and task T2 to asset P2.2 (resources ( ), 




1 2  ¸
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Table 5.VIII. Examples S2: task parameters 
value
T1 [1,0] 1 (0,1)
T2 [1,0] 1 (1,0)
T3 [0,1] 1 (0,1)
T4 [0,1] 1 (1,0)
Tasks Resource requirements Locations
 
Figure 5.5. Example S1.B: Gantt-Chart for Organizations A; 
accuracy 25% 
Table 5.VII. Example S1.B: Organizational Measures; 















I(m) E(m) CW(m) Ĭ gain area
DM1 2 2 4
DM2 2 2 4
DM1 1 0 1
DM2 1 0 1
DM1 2 0 2








Figure 5.6. Example S2: Networks of Dependent Tasks 
 
A. Example S2.A: dependent tasks with similar 
resource requirements 
The behavior of accrued gain functions of the 
organizations are reversed for scenario S1.B when 
compared to S1.A. We depict the measures of internal 
and external workload, aggregated workload and 
workload balance in Table 5.VII. The results show that  
Organization A has a higher aggregated workload than 
Organization B in executing the mission with 100% 
accuracy.  The trade-off of accuracy versus timeliness by 
organization A only decreased the gain measure. (25% 
accuracy allowed Organization A to accrue a gain area 
of 1 with a lower workload). Note that Organization B 
cannot achieve the same gain with any strategy other 
than the one depicted in Fig. 5.4. From the workload, 
workload balance and gain measures, we conclude that 
Organization B is more congruent to scenario S1.B than 
is the Organization A. The congruence stems from a 
proper match of DM-resource ownership with the task-
resource requirements. 
In this subsection, we consider the task communication 
network N1 depicted in Fig. 5.6. Task-asset-DM 
allocations for a mission execution accuracy of 100% are 
shown in Table 5.IX. 
Neither organization can achieve better timeliness by 
trading off task accuracy, because tasks require only a 
single resource unit. However, Organization A can avoid 
communication delays by efficiently assigning its assets. 
On the other hand, Organization B should either allow 
communication delay, or alternative asset allocation. The 
latter delays the task execution even further (since the 
distance to be traveled by the same asset between 
dependent tasks is 2 ; see Fig. 5.7). The resulting 
accrued gain plots are shown in Fig. 5.8; the workload 
measures and gain values are given in Table X. 
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Note, however, that, due to its divisional structure, the 
DMs in Organization B would have geographical areas 
of responsibility.  Consequently, only one of the 
discussed task-asset allocations would be employed as 
specified by rules of engagement. 
Table 5.IX. Example S2.A: task-asset-DM allocations; 
accuracy 100% 
tasks P1.1 P1.2 P2.1 P2.2 DM1 DM2 DM1 DM2
T1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
T2 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0
T3 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1
T4 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1




Table 5.X. Example S2.A: Organizational Measures; workload 
weights W  1  EI W
organization I(m) E(m) CW(m) Ĭ gain area
DM1 2 0 2
DM2 2 0 2
DM1 2 0 2
DM2 2 0 2
DM1 2 0 2
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Gain area = 10
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Gain area = 7.17
 
Figure 5.8. Example S2.A: Accrued Gain Plot 
 
Table 5.XI. Example S2.B: Organizational Measures; 
workload weights W  1  EI W
organization I(m) E(m) CW(m) Ĭ gain area
DM1 2 0 2
DM2 2 0 2
DM1 2 0 2
DM2 2 0 2
DM1 2 0 2













B. Example S2.B: dependent tasks with distinct 
resource requirements 
For the task dependence network N2 of Fig. 5.6, the 
situation is reversed. Using an approach similar to that 
used earlier, we obtain the workload and gain measures 
shown in Table 5.XI. Here, Organization B is congruent 
with the 4-task scenario, achieving the highest task gain 
with optimal workload balance. 
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Gain area = 4
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Gain area = 3
 
Figure 5.10. Example S3.A: Accrued Gain Plot 
 
Table 5.XII. Example S3.A: task parameters 
value
T1 [1,0] 1 (2,1)
T2 [0,1] 1 (2,1)
Tasks Resource requirements Locations
 
Table 5.XIII. Example S3.A: Organizational Measures; 
workload weights W  1  EI W
organization I(m) E(m) CW(m) Ĭ gain area
DM1 1 0 1
DM2 1 0 1
DM1 0 0 0
DM2 2 0 2
DM1 1 0 1














5.3. Congruence Based on Workload Balance  
In this section, we explore the effects of workload 
imbalance in either functional resources or geographic 
areas of responsibility on the processes of 
Organizations A and B. In the scenarios below, the 
desired mission completion time T  is equal to 4 time 
units. 
f
A. Example S3.A: geographical area imbalance 
Let the scenario consist of two tasks with task attributes as 
shown in Table 5.XII. The mission scenario is such that it 
loads the area closest to the assets allocated to DM2 in 
Organization B. Note that there exists an alternative 
assignment of assets to tasks as shown in Fig. 5.9, but it 
has deleterious effect on the accrued task gain (Fig. 5.10). 
Thus, in this case, there is a single optimal asset-task 
allocation for Organization A, while there are two 
alternative allocations for Organization B: one allows it to 
achieve a higher gain over time while resulting in 
imbalanced workload, and the other allows it to balance 
the workload with a delayed accrual of task gain (Table 
5.XIII). Evidently, Organization A is more congruent with 
this mission than is Organization B. 
B. Example S3.B: functional area imbalance 
Let the scenario consist of two tasks with task attributes as 
in Table 5.XIV. For this scenario, assume that there are no 
task communication or dependence delays (see Fig. 5.11).  
Consequently, the total gain (assuming ideal DM 
performance) is the same for both Organizations A and B. 
However, Organization B performs this mission by 
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allocating tasks to different DMs (workload is 
distributed), while organization A has to assign these 
tasks to the same DM, thus increasing its workload. As 
a result, the workload imbalance (41% higher than that 
in Organization B; see Table 5.XIII) is higher for  





























Figure 5.11. Example S3.B: Gantt-Charts for Organizations 
A and B; accuracy 100% 
 
Table 5.XIV. Example S3.B: task parameters 
value
T1 [1,0] 1 (0,1)
T2 [1,0] 1 (1,0)
Tasks Resource requirements Locations
 
Table 5.XV. Example S3.B: Organizational Measures; 
workload weights W  1  EI W
organization I(m) E(m) CW(m) Ĭ gain area
DM1 2 0 2
DM2 0 0 0
DM1 1 0 1









6. Methodology for Experiment-8 
In order to test and validate our hypothesis that the 
better an organization is matched to its mission, the 
better will that organization perform,  we designed an 
experiment to be conducted at NPS using the DDD 
team-in-the-loop simulator [6].  Instead of modeling an 
organization to execute a specified mission [8,9], we 
used a “reverse engineering” approach of designing 
mission scenarios that specifically (mis)matched 
selected organizational structures.  The concepts 
developed in [8,9] for modeling DM-resource allocation 
(Phase II) were used to create matches and mismatches 
between task-resource requirements and DM-resource 
capabilities by manipulating the need for multi-DM task 
processing (reducing the need for multi-DM processing in 
congruent cases, and increasing it in the incongruent 
ones).  Multi-DM task processing requires communication 
and asset synchronization among the DMs participating in 
task execution, thus increasing task execution latency.  
Based on our scheduling algorithms (Phase I of our design 
process), we can further increase the DM-DM dependence 
in incongruent cases by specifying a precedence structure 
among tasks that must be executed by different DMs.  
Thus, task latencies at a single DM greatly affect the 
overall performance of the team. The results for simple 
congruent and incongruent situations, discussed in Section 
5, provided the theoretical insights for the design of A2C2 
Experiment 8. 
To effectively test our congruence concepts empirically, 
the “distance” between the two organizational structures 
should be maximized to counter the inevitable 
experimental variance when dealing with human teams.  
The A2C2 experimenters preselected functional (F) and 
divisional (D) organizational structures.  These 
architectures (Table 6.I) represent two extreme cases of 
organizational structures, and therefore are suited for 
congruence analysis.  Two scenarios, termed functional (f) 
and divisional (d), were designed to create the matched 
situations for Ff (functional structure – functional 
scenario) and Dd (divisional organization and divisional 
scenario) cases, and to create mismatches for Fd and Df 
cases.  The human-in-the-loop experiment was conducted 
using 8 teams, and is described in a companion paper [7].  
Table 6.I. Generic Characteristics of Functional and Divisional 
Organizations 
One DM controls multiple types 
of resources One DM controls a single resource type
DMs have general knowledge 
about resources
DMs have more specialized knowledge
about the resources they control
DM controls all the resources on 
an asset carrier





The descriptions of designs for f and d mission scenarios 
and outlines of parameters for F and D organizations can 
be found in a companion paper [7]. The actual scenario 
designs have been developed in close cooperation between 
NPS and UConn, with UConn providing normative 
mission scenarios and organizational design, and NPS 
developing the actual DDD scenarios with realistic task 
models and specifications (Fig. 6.1). 




: Minimize overlap of resource
capabilities
• D: Maximize overlap of resource
capabilities
Need two distinct structures – Divisional vs. Functional
Need to manipulate effects of resource requirements for 
congruent/incongruent cases
Need two distinct structures – Divisional vs. Functional
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Final DDD Experiment-8 Designi l  ri t-  i
2. Scenario - Coordination
sks requiring multiple resources 
of same type
• d: tasks requiring multiple resources 
of different types
3. Scenario - Task load
ad single geographical area 
over multiple functions and time 
• d: load single functional area over a
wide geographical region and time








Figure 6.1. Experiment-8 Design Modeling Cycle 
7. Predictions versus Experimental Results 
We compared the analytical predictions with empirical 
data from the human-in-the-loop experiment using 
similar measures, including the total accrued task  gain 
(based on the task scoring method, and identifying the 
trade-off between task latency and task accuracy), gain 
area, number of DM-DM assists (needed for multi-DM 
task processing, and termed external coordination in 
the 3-phase design process), and total workload 
distribution measure.  Measures from the DDD 
simulations were extracted using the new DDD Post 
Processor [12]. 
In the rest of this section, we compare the pre-
experiment normative predictions obtained by the 
ORGDESIGN software [13]. The results of applying 
Phase I (scheduling) of organizational design process to 
experimental scenarios and organizations, and those of 
human-in-the-loop experiment conducted at NPS [7], 
[3], [4] are compared. The data is extracted for time-
critical tasks only, which include the mission tasks and 
attack-defend tasks, as indicated by commander’s intent. 
For complete experiment results, see companion papers 
[3], [4].  
Predicted results are based on the model for which the 
100% accuracy is required and platform allocation delay 
(when asset request is needed) is equal to  sec. 
The empirical data are averaged over all teams performing 
the corresponding organization-mission pair (see [7]). The 
mission time was 
50 A9
2100 fT  sec for each scenario. 
7.1. Scenario f 
Scenario f, designed to be congruent with organization F 
and incongruent with organization D, contained tasks 
similar to those in Examples S1.A, S2.A, and S3.A 
(Section 5), but with realistic resource requirements.  
The results for accrued task gain are shown in Fig. 7.1. We 
can see that congruent organization (F) outperforms the 
incongruent one (D, dotted line). The disparity of actual 
pattern of accrued gain over time is attributed to the task 
execution time, which varies according to the task 
allocation/scheduling strategies employed by the 
normative organization and human teams. Also, the 
simulated model uses simplistic assumptions of fixed 
coordination (asset request) time, and does not allow the 
timeliness/accuracy tradeoff (100% accuracy is required). 
The total aggregated accrued gain is higher in normative 
organizations due to the above restrictions of the 
ORGDESIGN model, as well as the assumption of an 
ideal agent model that does not account for effects of 
accrued workload on DM performance. 
Predictedr i t Experimentri t
 
Figure 7.1. Gain plot for Time-critical tasks: Scenario f 
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The gain accrued by the human team strongly depends 
on the accuracy-timeliness trade-offs employed by 
human agents during the mission. Although the 
predicted value of total accrued gain was higher than 
the one achieved by human teams in the experiment, the 
overall difference in gain area, which identifies the 
congruence difference between organizations F and D 
on mission f, was higher in experimental data (see Fig. 
7.2). The difference in gain areas between the 
congruent (F) and incongruent (D) organizations for 
scenario f, computed via 








fDfF  ' , 
was predicted to be 8.7%, but was observed to be 
21.7% in Experiment 8. This is due to the fact that the 





















Figure 7.2. Gain Area Measure: Scenario f 
The incongruent organization tried to adapt by 
sacrificing the accuracy (instantaneous task gain) in 
order to achieve the mission faster. Fig. 7.3 provides the 
insight in the congruence characterization: the 
congruent organization achieves a higher gain area (higher 
mission tempo). Indeed, it executes the mission with a 
lower external coordination (higher speed of command – 
lower number of DM-DM assists). Consequently, the 
congruent organization executes the mission with higher 
independence of DMs and lower cognitive load for 
mission execution. In this figure, we show the average 
external coordination per DM. 
Given that organization F achieves a higher gain with 
lower coordination load than organization D, we conclude 
that it is more congruent than the latter to mission scenario 
f. Our models predicted the pattern of incongruence in 
organization D: incongruence was due to mismatches 
between the resource capabilities of DMs in D and the 
resource requirements of tasks in scenario f. These 
mismatches were modeled by having tasks that required 
multiple resources of the same type, as well as time-
loading of geographical areas over time. 
7.2. Scenario d 
Scenario d, designed to be congruent with organization D, 
and incongruent with organization F, contained tasks that 
are similar to those in Examples S1.B, S2.B, and S3.B 
(Section 5), but with realistic resource requirements.  
The normative and experimental accrued task gains are 
shown in Fig. 7.4. We can see that congruent organization 
(D, dotted line) outperforms the incongruent one (F). The 
disparity in actual pattern of accrued gain over time is 
attributed to the same modeling constraints as in scenario f 


































































































































































Figure 7.3. External Coordination versus Gain Area 




Predictedr i t Experimentri t
 
Figure 7.4. Gain plot for Time-critical tasks: Scenario d 
 
The total aggregated accrued gain is higher in 
normative organizations due to these restrictions of the 
ORGDESIGN model. Although the predicted value of 
total accrued gain was higher than the one achieved by 
human teams in the experiment, the overall differences 
in gain area, which identifies the congruence difference 
between organizations F and D on mission d, was 
higher in experimental data (see Fig. 7.5). The 
difference in gain areas between the congruent (D) and 
incongruent (F) organizations for scenario d, computed 
via 








dFdD  ' , was predicted to be 
9.8%, but was observed to be 39.6% in Experiment 8. 
The effects of modeled coordination and multi-DM task 
processing have been even more pronounced in this 
scenario. This is due to the fact that multi-resource 
tasks (scenario d) force the multi-DM task processing 
in incongruent organization F (since there is very little 
overlap between resource capabilities of DMs in this 
organization), whereas tasks that require multiple 
resources of the same type (scenario f) do not 
necessarily require multi-DM task processing in 
incongruent organization D, since each DM possesses 
multiple resource capabilities of single type. The multi-
DM task processing is achieved in this case from 
constraints on the resource utilization (weapon duty-
cycle prohibits the simultaneous use of assets with the 
same resource type located on a single platform) and 
task processing (tasks have a processing time window).  
Given that organization D achieves a higher gain with 
lower coordination load than organization F, we 
conclude that it is more congruent than the latter to 
mission scenario d. Our models predicted the pattern of 
incongruence in organization F, which was due to 
mismatches between the resource capabilities of DMs in F 
and the resource requirements of tasks in scenario d. 
These mismatches were modeled through tasks that 
required resources of different types, as well as time-




















Figure 7.5. Gain Area Measure: Scenario d 
 
8. Conclusions and Future Extensions 
In this paper, we defined structure-based congruence 
measures by evaluating the closeness of task parameters 
with the organizational structure and processes. In order to 
validate the normative predictions, namely that structure-
based congruence leads to performance-based congruence, 
we designed and conducted a team-in-the-loop A2C2 
experiment using two different organizational structures 
and two different missions.  In this paper, we described 
how we reverse-engineered missions to generate 
mismatches with organizations, and how we modeled the 
specific structural mismatches and matches among the 
corresponding elements of organizations and missions. 
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The model served as the basis for our structure-based 
congruence framework. 
In our experiments, we found that the model-predicted 
structural mismatch between an organization and a 
mission indeed resulted in degraded performance in the 
non-congruent cases when compared to the congruent 
ones – specifically in terms of timeliness of task 
execution, coordination workload, and the total gain 
attained by the organization. We found that the 
congruent organization achieves a higher gain area 
(higher mission tempo) while executing the mission 
with lower external coordination (higher speed of 
command – lower number of DM-DM assists) and, as a 
result, higher independence of DMs and lower 
cognitive load for mission execution. 
The analytic methods, applications, and measures 
illustrated in the paper form the basis for current 
research on organizational design and adaptation for 
large-scale human-machine systems. Although our 
normative models predicted the overall performance 
trend, the disparity between the predicted and 
experimental performance is due to the limited nature 
of our organizational models, as well as inherent nature 
of humans to make trade-offs among team objectives in 
executing the mission. Such trade-offs were not allowed 
in our models, and ideal agent models were employed. 
In our modeling, all tasks must be executed with 100% 
accuracy, and a fixed coordination delay model was 
utilized.  In spite of these limitations, the model 
predicted the observed trends very well.  Investigating 
the agent models with cognitive biases and human 
limitations, different task priorities and limited look-
ahead decision-rules, as well as exploring other 
dependent variables that describe organizational 
processes, would constitute the next step in our 
modeling process. 
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